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PROSECUTING ALLEGED ISRAELI WAR 
CRIMINALS IN ENGLAND AND WALES 
 
Daniel Machover and Kate Maynard*
 
The criminal justice system in England & Wales is faced with allegations 
made by Palestinians of Israeli war crimes contrary to the Geneva 
Conventions Act 1957 (and which in some cases also involve allegations of 
torture contrary to s134 Criminal Justice Act 1988) – how will it cope with 
this challenge? 
 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO ISSUES 
 
In 2005, the authors1 worked with lawyers from the Palestinian Centre for 
Human Rights (PCHR)2, on behalf of mutual clients, on files of evidence for 
use in England and Wales relating to alleged “grave breaches” of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention 1949,3 including torture (which is also an international 
crime regardless of the existence of a military occupation).4 Evidence files 
* Daniel Machover is a partner and Kate Maynard an assistant solicitor at Hickman and 
Rose Solicitors in London. 
1 The authors, Daniel Machover and Kate Maynard, are extremely grateful to Sonya 
Shah, formerly a paralegal at Hickman and Rose Solicitors and currently an LLM. 
student at London University, for her significant contribution and research work. Any 
errors or omissions are of course the sole responsibility of the authors. 
2 PCHR is an independent Palestinian human rights organization based in Gaza City. 
The Centre enjoys Consultative Status with the ECOSOC of the United Nation.  It is an 
affiliate of the International Commission of Jurists-Geneva, the International 
Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) – Pairs, and the Euro-Mediterranean Human 
Rights Network - Copenhagen, Arab Organization for Human Rights – Cairo.  It is a 
recipient of the 1996 French Republic Award on Human Rights and the 2002 Bruno 
Kreisky Award for Outstanding Achievements in the Area of Human Rights.  More 
information about PCHR can be found on its website at: www.pchrgaza.org. 
3 Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. 
Geneva, 12 August 1949, Vol 75 UNTS 287 (IVGC). 
4 Israel signed the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984, G.A. Res 39/46 39 UN GAOR Supp (No. 
51) UN Doc. A/39/51 (1984), entered into force in 1987, Vol 1465 UNTS 85 
(UNCAT) on 22 October 1986 and ratified it on 3 October 1991. The Convention 
entered into force in Israel on 2 November 1991. Article 5 (2) of UNCAT requires each 
state party to take measures to establish universal jurisdiction over persons suspected of 
torture, unless it extradites the suspect. The UK ratified UNCAT on 8 December 1988 
and it took effect on 7 January 1989. Section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 
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relating to Gaza cases were handed over to the anti-terrorist and war crimes 
unit of the Metropolitan police on 26 August 2005.5
Naturally, in such cases, lawyers in England and Wales are reliant to a 
great extent on the collection of evidence by lawyers and other human rights 
defenders in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT). The cases discussed 
here therefore have their origins in work carried out by many such people, 
primarily PCHR, led by Raji Sourani,6 and by a variety of other lawyers, 
NGOs, academics and researchers working in the OPT. Without this 
professional, dedicated and often dangerous work, it would simply not have 
been possible to credibly pursue cases in England and Wales.   
Grave breaches are criminalised in England and Wales under the Geneva 
Conventions Act 1957 (the 1957 Act).7 The 1957 Act was introduced in order 
to comply with this country’s treaty obligations to provide domestic laws to 
enable “universal jurisdiction” to be exercised over the grave breaches 
specified in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. The alleged victims only 
sought remedies in England and Wales because they were denied any remedy 
through the Israeli legal system. 
 
(a) The allegations 
 
Before considering in detail the legal issues mentioned above it will be 
helpful to set out more details of the type of cases under review and how they 
have been dealt with so far in England and Wales. The following cases, which 
all identify Major General (reserve) Doron Almog8 as a suspect, demonstrate 
very well the allegations made by Palestinians under occupation:  
 
 
makes it a criminal offence for a public official or person acting in an official capacity 
to commit torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, whatever 
his nationality and wherever in the world he commits the offence.  
5 In the absence of a national police force, the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS), as 
the largest police authority in the country, has traditionally provided a ‘home’ for major 
national/international police operations. In the early 1990s the MPS established a 
centrally funded War Crimes Unit to investigate cases under the War Crimes Act 1991, 
regarding allegations dating back to World War II. That Unit was disbanded in 1999, 
but a ‘dedicated section’ of the Anti-Terrorist Unit of the MPS continued to have 
responsibility to investigate war crimes and related international crimes – see Hansard 
HC 14 June 2005 c296W. 
6 Raji Sourani is a practising lawyer and the Director of PCHR. He has been detained at 
various times by both Israel and the Palestinian Authority. 
7 1957 c 52. 
8 GOC Southern Command of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) from 8 December 2000 
to 7 July 2003. 
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1. The demolition of 59 houses in Rafah, Gaza Strip, on 10 January 2002 
2. The killing of Noha Shukri Al Makadma on 3 March 2003 as the result of a 
punitive house demolition 
3. The killing of Mohamad Abd Elrahman on 30 December 2001 
4. The dropping of a one ton bomb on the Al Daraj neighbourhood of Gaza 
City on 22 July 2002 
 
Mr Almog was due to speak at a synagogue in Solihull, Birmingham, on 11 
September 2005. After having received the files of evidence as to his criminal 
liability for the above alleged offences, the police failed to make a decision 
whether they would arrest Doron Almog under their “general arrest” powers. 
However, they adopted a neutral stance in relation to the complainants’ 
application to Bow Street Magistrates’ Court for an arrest warrant.  That step 
does not require the consent of the police, the Director of Public Prosecutions 
(DPP) or the Attorney General (s25 Prosecution of Offences Act 1985), 
whereas a prosecution under the 1957 Act in principle requires all their 
involvement, and in practice the Attorney General must provide his consent for 
proceedings to be instituted.9   
 
(b) The warrant 
 
A hearing took place at Bow Street Magistrates’ Court on 9 September 
2005, before Senior District Judge Timothy Workman. The application was for 
warrants in all four of the above cases in which Doron Almog was named as a 
suspect. The Court was provided with all of the evidence that had been 
supplied to the police in relation to those cases. The Senior District Judge 
adjourned the matter overnight and on the morning of Saturday, 10 September, 
he issued a warrant for the arrest of Doron Almog (backed for bail but with 
stringent conditions) in relation to the complaint regarding the 59 house 
demolitions. The Senior District Judge indicated that the other cases would be 
more appropriately proceeded with by giving the police the opportunity to 
interview Doron Almog under caution. (The issue of an arrest warrant in a case 
precludes that step.) 
It appears that on the afternoon of 11 September 2005, the police waited at 
the immigration desk at Heathrow airport for Doron Almog to disembark from 
an El-Al flight that had arrived some time earlier, but when he did not emerge 
9 The Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 created the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), 
which is headed up by the DPP. The Attorney General is a member of the cabinet of 
the Government of the day, has final responsibility for enforcing criminal law and 
‘superintends’ the DPP Section 1A (3) of the 1957 Act provides that ‘proceedings for 
an offence shall not be instituted…except by or with the consent of the Attorney 
General’. 
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the police failed to board the ‘plane to arrest him, as they were perfectly 
entitled to do.10 An article “posted” at 4.15pm on 11 September 2005 on the 
website of the Israeli newspaper “Ha’aretz” first reported the news that Doron 
Almog had evaded arrest by remaining on the ‘plane until it returned to Israel.  
Subsequently, in an interview on Channel 4 television news, on the evening 
of Tuesday, 13 September, Doron Almog stated that the flight crew initially 
asked him to wait on the ‘plane and that he was then told that the military 
attaché to the Israeli Embassy was coming to speak to him. Mr Almog said that 
he telephoned the attaché on his mobile ‘phone but soon afterwards the attaché 
came onto the ‘plane to brief him in person. He stated that the attaché told him 
“There is a warrant arrest (sic) against you waiting at the immigration office 
and we advise you…to stay aboard and get back to Israel”. (This interview 
echoed comments that Mr Almog was already reported to have made to Israeli 
journalists, as published in the Hebrew press.)  
 
(c) The aftermath  
 
The police were asked to: 
 
1. Urgently investigate the leak of the existence of the warrant; 
2. Explain why the officers did not board the aeroplane to arrest Mr Almog 
when he did not disembark as expected; 
3. Investigate the role of staff from the Israeli Embassy in assisting Mr Almog 
to escape arrest; and 
4. Make the arrest warrant international/European. 
 
At the time of writing (January 2005) none of the above had been 
conducted. Indeed the fourth request quickly became redundant when the 
warrant was formally cancelled by Senior District Judge Workman on 14 
September 2005 The failure of the police to address the remaining issues is 
now the subject of a police complaint that the authors have asked the police to 
refer for independent investigation by the Independent Police Complaints 
Commission.  
10 As confirmed by Hazel Blears, Home Office Minister, Hansard HC 25 Oct 2005 
c344W, under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), s 17(1)(a), a 
constable may enter and search any premises for the purpose of executing a search 
warrant of arrest issued in connection with or arising out of criminal proceedings. An 
aircraft is specified under the meaning of 'premises' by PACE, s 23(a). 
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Further, the British Government has decided to review the law following 
lobbying by the Government of Israel to try to ensure that in future similar 
arrest warrants cannot be issued at the request of complainants.11
 
THE LAW12
 
Some historical legal perspective is needed to fully appreciate the 
significance of the above events. The importance to civilians under occupation 
of the practical application of “universal jurisdiction” cannot be 
underestimated. Indeed those who drafted IVGC were conscious of the 
vulnerability of civilians under occupation. When IVGC was negotiated, the 
actions of Germany and Japan as military occupiers were fresh in the minds of 
all concerned. Third parties (that is, including those not involved in a particular 
conflict) were given legal obligations so that they might effectively “hold the 
ring” between the military occupier and the (otherwise unrepresented) civilians 
under occupation.  
The relevant provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention 1949 are as 
follows: 
 
“ARTICLE 146 
The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any 
legislation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for 
persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the 
grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the 
following Article.  
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to 
search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have 
ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring 
such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own 
courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the 
provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for 
trial to another High Contracting Party concerned, provided 
such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case.  
Each High Contracting Party shall take measures necessary for 
the suppression of all acts contrary to the provisions of the 
present Convention other than the grave breaches defined in 
the following Article.  
11 See Hansard: HC 29 Nov 2005 c298W and HC 7 Dec 2005 c1363W. 
12 See also, Daniel Machover and Kate Maynard ‘The UK's duty to 'universal 
jurisdiction' The Times October  4 2005. 
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In all circumstances, the accused persons shall benefit by 
safeguards of proper trial and defence, which shall not be less 
favourable than those provided by Article 105 and those 
following of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment 
of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949.  
 
 
ARTICLE 147 
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be 
those involving any of the following acts, if committed against 
persons or property protected by the present Convention: 
wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including 
biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or 
serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or 
transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, 
compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile 
Power, or wilfully depriving a protected person of the rights of 
fair and regular trial prescribed in the present Convention, 
taking of hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation 
of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out 
unlawfully and wantonly.” 
 
The very first words of the second paragraph of Article 146 above (i.e. 
“each High Contracting Party”) make it clear in the context of this Convention 
that Article 146 includes non belligerent State parties to the Convention, not 
just States that are involved in the conflict in question.  Moreover, the phrase 
“each High Contracting Party” is used elsewhere in the Convention, making it 
very clear that those who drafted it did really mean to address every High 
Contracting Party.   
Although it is unnecessary to have recourse to the Travaux Preparatoires 
(i.e. as a “supplementary means of interpretation” of this provision, pursuant to 
Article 3 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties 196913), the 
discussions of those who drafted the Convention makes this interpretation 
abundantly clear.  Debates concerning an Italian proposal to limit this provision 
to the parties to a conflict, and the way that proposal was rejected, also make it 
very clear that Article 146 was drafted to achieve “true universality”.14   
The three distinct (and positive and interdependent) obligations imposed on 
each High Contracting party, and the practical application of these duties in 
Britain, are illustrated below. 
13 Vol 1155 UNTS 331. 
14 This is a phrase used in The War Office, The Law of War on land, being Part III of 
the Manual of Military Law, H Lauterpacht (Ed) 1958.   
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(a) The duty to enact legislation 
 
The Geneva Conventions Bill was introduced first in the House of Lords.15 On 
25 June 1957, the then Lord Chancellor, Viscount Kilmuir said the following: 
 
“The Conventions require the parties either to try in their own 
Courts persons accused of these offences, wherever the 
breaches are committed and regardless of the nationality of the 
accused, or else to hand them over to another party to the 
conventions for Trial.  [T]he offences . . . shall be triable in the 
UK wherever and by whomsoever the offences were 
committed.  This is an unusual extension of our jurisdiction, 
but it is made necessary by the special circumstances against 
which we are providing.” 16
 
Later in the debate, Viscount Alexander of Hillsborough (opposition 
spokesman) said the following: 
 
“I was going to say a word or two about the question of the 
changes in powers in trying in our Courts certain of the 
offences committed by persons of other nationalities; but after 
what the noble and learned Viscount, the Lord Chancellor has 
said, there is no need to do anything of that kind.  I feel most 
strongly and I am sure that your Lordship’s House will feel, 
that whilst we know that when a great and savage war occurs 
conventions are often overridden, nevertheless conventions 
have played their part when they have been almost universally 
observed by those engaged in the strife . . . so I think we are 
taking a good step in the right direction in seeking for this 
ratification.” 
 
In Committee, on 2 July 1957, the Bill was amended unopposed to include 
“persons who aid, abet or procure” grave breaches.  When the matter went 
before the House of Commons on 12 July 1957, the Joint Under Secretary of 
State for the Home Department, a Mr Simon MP, noted the following: 
 
“This Bill marks a considerable departure in our criminal law.  
It makes liable to the criminal jurisdiction of our domestic 
15 In accordance with the principle established in Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593. 
16 Hansard, HL Deb 25 June 1957 c348.  
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courts persons accused of certain offences wherever the 
breaches are committed and regardless of the nationality of the 
accused.  There is very limited precedent for such a provision 
in our law but we believe that such a departure is necessary, if 
we are to honour certain new types of international obligations 
now recognised as morally binding.”17
 
In the same debate, Sir Frank Soskice accepted in principle “the departure 
from the criminal law which this Bill involves” and recognised that Britain 
should be “ready to shoulder the obligations” imposed by the Geneva 
Conventions.  There is nothing in the debates held in Parliament that indicates 
that it was the intention of Parliament that either the victim or the alleged 
perpetrator should be a British national or that there had to be a direct 
connection between the offences alleged and England and Wales.   
Furthermore it is well established that at least grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions have also risen to the status of jus cogens offences.18 Such 
offences cannot be derogated from or modified unless by similar customary 
law.19  It is suggested that jus cogens offences also attract universal 
jurisdiction20 and that as a consequence of recognising an offence as an 
elevated level of offence, it carries a duty to either prosecute or extradite those 
accused of carrying out such crimes.21  
 
(b) The duty to search 
 
The authoritative commentary on the Fourth Geneva Convention published 
by the International Committee of the Red Cross (edited by Dr Jean Pictet) says 
as to the active duty to search for alleged offenders of all nationalities: 
 
“As soon as a contracting party realises that there is on its 
territory a person who has committed . . . a [grave] breach, its 
duty is to ensure that the person concerned is arrested and 
prosecuted with all speed.  The necessary police action should 
17 Hansard, HC volume 573, p 716. 
18 See T Meron Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law (Oxford 
University Press, 1989) pp 41-62. 
19 See I Brownlie Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 6th 
ed, 2003) p 488. 
20 Kenneth Randall ‘Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law’ 66 Tex L Rev 
800–815.  
21 M Cherif Bassiouni ‘International Crime: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Erga Omnes’ 
(1996) 59 Law & Contemp Probs  63,  at 65-66. 
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be taken spontaneously, therefore, not merely in pursuance of a 
request from another State.” 22  
 
The ICRC commentary confirms that a High Contracting Party is not 
entitled to sit back and do nothing but has an active obligation to search. It 
follows that this duty should include maintaining border controls that enable a 
state to ensure that known suspects seeking to enter the jurisdiction are arrested 
on arrival. In the British context, common sense dictates that the necessary 
spontaneous police action can only occur where alleged war crimes have been 
investigated to the point where the police are able to decide whether there are 
reasonable grounds to arrest a suspect who arrives in or is discovered in the 
jurisdiction. For the authors, the deterrence value of this Article hinges largely 
on this obligation.  There is certainly no question under the Convention that the 
nationality of the individual concerned or of any victim is relevant to the 
exercise of jurisdiction.  The ICRC Commentary, following the passage 
referred to above, states: 
 
“The Court proceedings should be carried out in a uniform 
manner whatever the nationality of the accused.  Nationals, 
friends, enemies, all should be subject to the same rules of 
procedure and judged by the same Courts.” 
 
(c) The duty to prosecute or extradite 
 
The unequivocal wording of the duty of each High Contracting Party in 
article 146 of IVGC indicates that once a suspect is located in the territory of a 
High Contracting Party, the state has a duty to either prosecute or extradite the 
alleged war criminal to enable a prosecution.23 The duty to “prosecute or 
extradite” has been emphasised by the UN on several occasions. Notably, the 
UN General Assembly Resolution Principles of international co-operation in 
the detection, arrest, extradition and punishment of persons guilty of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity24 specifically states: 
 
22 ICRC Volume IV Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War: commentary (Geneva, 1958) p 598. Although commonly referred to as 
‘Pictet’s Commentary’ the commentary on IVGC was written mainly by Oscar Uhler 
and Henri Coursier, with the participation of F Siordet, C Pilloud, J-P Schoenholzer, R-
J Wilhelm and R Boppe. 
23 M Scharf ‘The Letter of the Law: The Scope of the International Legal Obligation to 
Prosecute Human Rights Crimes’ (1996) 59 Law & Contemp Probs 41, at 43 
24 GA Res 3074 (XXVIII), 28 GAOR Supp No (30A), UN Doc A/9030/Add 1 (1973) 
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“War crimes and crimes against humanity, wherever they are 
committed, shall be subject to investigation and the persons 
against whom there is evidence that they have committed such 
crimes shall be subject to tracing, arrest, trial and, if found 
guilty, to punishment.”25
 
The resolution goes on to provide that: 
 
“States shall not take any legislative or other measures which 
may be prejudicial to the international obligations they have 
assumed in regard to the detection, arrest, extradition and 
punishment-of persons guilty of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.”26 
 
Further, according to the General Assembly Resolution adopted by the UN, 
two years earlier, in 1971, a refusal by states to co-operate in fulfilling their 
obligations under the Geneva Conventions including the arrest, extradition, 
trial and punishment of those accused of war crimes, “is contrary to the general 
purposes and aims of the UN Charter and recognized norms of international 
law.”27
Arguably, the maxim aut dedere aut judicare28 also applies to grave 
breaches/war crimes by virtue of their nature as universally reprehended 
offences and because such offences are “of concern to all states and all states 
ought therefore to cooperate in bringing those who commit such offences to 
justice.”29 The practice of states is not in fact generally consistent with this 
duty,30 but there is nonetheless a strong case for assuming that there is a 
customary international law duty to prosecute war crimes in light of existing 
treaties, declarations and practice in relation to crimes committed during the 
Second World War.31
25 Ibid paragraph 1. 
26 Ibid paragraph 8. 
27 GA Res 2048 (XXVI), 27 UN GAOR Supp (No 29), UN Doc A/8429 (1971)  
28 See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni and Edward M. Wise Aut Dedere Aut Judicare 
The Duty to Extradite or Prosecute in International Law (M Nijhof, 1995). 
29 Ibid p 24. 
30 See M Cherif Bassiouni ‘Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical 
Perspectives and Contemporary Practice’ 42 Va J Int’l L 81 at 117 and C Edelenbos 
‘Prosecution of Human Rights Violations’ (1994) 7 LJIL 5 at 15-16 & 20. 
31 Ibid Edelenbos at 15. 
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In relation to torture, it is argued that UNCAT32 specifically imposes an 
obligation to either prosecute or extradite those accused of committing torture 
by virtue of Article 7.1 of the Torture Convention.  This article states: 
  
“The State Party in the territory under whose jurisdiction a 
person alleged to have committed any offence referred to in 
article 4 is found shall in the cases contemplated in article 5, if 
it does not extradite him, submit the case to its competent 
authorities for the purpose of prosecution.” 
 
This position was affirmed by Lord Brown-Wilkinson in the Pinochet (No. 
3) case33 when he stated: 
  
“The purpose of the Convention was to introduce the principle 
of aut dedere aut punire – either you extradite or you punish.” 
 
Furthermore, the wording of Article 7.1 of the Torture Convention clearly 
indicates that the obligation arises when an alleged offender is found in the 
territory of the State Party and is thus capable of providing for universal 
jurisdiction. The courts of England and Wales therefore have universal 
jurisdiction over acts of torture under the Criminal Justice Act 1988, s 134 
(which covers acts committed “in the UK or elsewhere”). There is no 
requirement for any connection with England and Wales of the defendant, 
victim or suspects.    
 
IMPUNITY IN ISRAEL 
 
Of course, it is always to be hoped that a country engaged in a military 
occupation will uphold civilised standards and avoid the temptation to take 
advantage of the overpowering strength it wields over the civilians under its 
control. Occupying armies and the military and civilian legal systems of the 
occupying power should be able to bring to account its own “war criminals”.   
Unfortunately, the record shows that most alleged grave breaches in the 
OPT are not even investigated as such by Israel. They are either ignored or 
officially sanctioned as legal in the teeth of international legal opinion to the 
contrary.  
For many years, most cases of punitive house demolitions, killings and 
torture in the occupied Palestinian territories have not been the subject of 
32 See n 4 above. 
33 Regina v Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrates and Others, Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte 
(No 3) [2000] 1 AC 147 per Lord Brown-Wilkinson at 200.  
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criminal investigations, let alone prosecutions.  The failures of the Israeli legal 
system are well documented by now but can be illustrated briefly by some of 
the cases in point (in relation to house demolitions and assassinations). 
 
(a) Punitive house demolitions 
 
According to PCHR, between 29 September 2000 and 31 January 2005, 
more than 2,702 houses in the Gaza Strip were completely demolished by the 
Israeli occupying forces since the outbreak of the (second) intifada, rendering 
thousands of Palestinian civilians homeless.34 B’Tselem put the figure of house 
demolitions in the whole of the OPT from September 2000 to November 2004, 
as 4,170.35  
According to a policy brief by Harvard University to the United Nations 
Information System on the Question of Palestine (UNISPAL),36 house 
demolitions broadly come within three categories: 
 
1. First, houses are demolished by Israeli occupation forces because a 
building permit was not sought prior to their construction, or for some 
other technical breach of applicable administrative law.  
2. Second, houses are demolished as part of military operations. Such 
destructions are arguably necessary during armed hostilities and fall to be 
judged under the rules relating to military necessity.  
3. Finally, demolitions occur outside the scope of military operations or 
Israeli administrative power in the OPT. These demolitions are purportedly 
a response against persons suspected of taking part in - or directly 
supporting - criminal or guerrilla activities. These demolitions are referred 
to routinely as “punitive demolitions”.  
 
The distinction in practice is however often difficult to determine, 
particularly between 2 and 3 above. 
A series of cases in the Supreme Court of Israel confirm that the domestic 
courts do not regard the policy of punitive house demolitions as unlawful.37 
34 http://www.pchrgaza.org/Library/alaqsaintifada.htm
35http://www.btselem.org/English/Publications/Summaries/200411_Punitive_House_D
emolitions.asp  
36http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/13f65639b6eb7b9485256ea600641d69?Open
Document  
37 eg Almarin v IDF Commander in Gaza Strip HCJ 2722/92 (the authority of the 
commander extends to the destruction of those parts of the property that are owned or 
used by members of the family of the suspect or by others), Janimat v OC Central 
Command HCJ 2006/97 (the court refused to interfere with the discretion of the 
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The authority for punitive house demolitions stem from the Defence 
(Emergency) Regulations 1945 (according to Israeli courts that insist the 
Regulations are still good law). These regulations were introduced into the 
legal structure of Palestine by Britain, in response to resistance to British rule. 
Regulation 119(1) states: 
  
“A Military Commander may by order direct the forfeiture to 
the Government of Palestine of any house, structure, or land 
from which he has reason to suspect that any firearm has been 
illegally discharged, or any bomb, grenade or explosive or 
incendiary article illegally thrown, or of any house, structure or 
land situated in any area, town, village, quarter or street the 
inhabitants or some of the inhabitants of which he is satisfied 
have committed, or attempted to commit, or abetted the 
commission of, or been accessories after the fact to the 
commission of, any offence against these Regulations 
involving violence or intimidation or any Military Court 
offence; and when any house, structure or land is forfeited as 
aforesaid, the Military Commander may destroy the house or 
the structure or anything on growing on the land.”  
 
Demolitions purportedly required by military necessity must be judged by 
internationally accepted criteria (i.e. as set out in the above policy brief to 
UNISPAL): 
 
1. The individual house must offer an essential and immediate contribution to 
the enemy’s military operation and, therefore, endanger the security of the 
occupation forces; and 
2. The demolition of the house must, at the time, be an adequate response to 
that specific threat and there must be no less intrusive response possible; 
and 
3. The demolition of the house must offer concrete military advantages that 
outweigh the damage caused to the civilian asset and its consequences on 
the life of Palestinian individuals and families.  
 
The facts of each case must meet this (relatively high) threshold, otherwise 
the house demolition in question is not a militarily necessary.  
Two cases involving house demolitions were presented to the police and 
Bow Street Magistrates’ Court in relation to Doron Almog, alleging the grave 
 
military commander and stop the house demolition ordered by the military commander 
of the West Bank).  
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breach of “extensive destruction of property not justified by military necessity 
and carried out unlawfully and wantonly”. 
One involved the demolition of 59 houses in Rafah by bulldozer on 10 
January 2002. The IDF gave conflicting and inconsistent reasons for these 
demolitions, including that the operation was a retaliatory measure for the 
(unrelated) death of two Israeli soldiers,38 to weaken the fear of the existence of 
tunnels39, and for purported reasons of military necessity.  
The other case involved the punitive demolition of the house of the family 
of a suspected suicide bomber by dynamite, which partially demolished a 
neighbouring house killing Noha Shukri Al Makadma who was in her ninth 
month of pregnancy.40
The victims in both of these cases claimed that these demolitions were 
illegal, but no investigation took place.  PCHR attempted to instigate 
investigations into both of these cases. In relation to the case of the 59 house 
demolitions, PCHR wrote to the IDF legal advisor requesting a criminal 
investigation, but no reply was received.  In relation to the house demolition 
that killed Noha Shukri Al Makadma, PCHR wrote to the Legal Advisor of the 
IDF requesting an inquiry and for disciplinary measures to be brought against 
those responsible. In its reply, the Ministry of Defence expressed regret for the 
“injuries of guiltless people” but rejected the request for an inquiry.  
Evidence of two other similar punitive house demolitions by dynamite in 
the Gaza Strip conducted in the four months prior to the death of Noha Shukri 
Al Makadma and ending in civilian deaths, were also presented to the British 
police as “evidence of similar fact”. In both these cases PCHR wrote to the 
legal advisor of the IDF requesting criminal investigations and asking for the 
IDF to change their practices to avoid further deaths of innocent civilians. In 
one case no reply was ever received. In the other, without any obvious inquiry, 
the reply stated that there was “no suspicion of any breach of duty by the IDF 
to warrant the opening of a criminal investigation”.  
On 17 February 2005, Defence Minister Shaul Mofaz announced the end to 
the policy of demolishing the houses of “terrorist’s” families.41 However, the 
38http://web.archive.org/web/20031011141900/www.idf.il/english/announcements/200
2/january/11.stm
39http://web.archive.org/web/20030807150540/www.idf.il/english/announcements/200
2/january/27.stm
40 In the case of the killing of Noha Shukri Al Makadma, it was alleged that the 
property destruction was extensive as part of a wider policy of ‘extensive’ punitive 
house demolitions of the Government of Israel and implemented by military 
commanders. It was also alleged that her death also amounted to the grave breach of 
wilful killing. 
41 See the official IDF announcement: 
http://www1.idf.il/DOVER/site/mainpage.asp?clr=1&sl=EN&id=7&docid=37885
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demolition of Palestinian homes purportedly for reasons of military necessity 
has not abated.  
 
(b) Targeted assassinations 
 
According to PCHR, from 29 September 2000 to 31 January 2005, Israeli 
occupying forces and settlers killed 2,714 Palestinian Civilians in the OPT. 418 
(14%) were killed in assassination operations, and of these, at least 154 were 
bystanders, of whom 44 were children.42  
Evidence in relation to one of these assassination operations was presented 
to the British police. This was the well known case of the assassination of 
Salah Shehadeh. 
Between 11.30 pm and midnight on 22 July 2002, an Israeli F16 fighter 
plane dropped a one ton bomb on the Al Daraj neighbourhood of Gaza City 
(“the al-Daraj bombing”). The target of the bombing was the house of 
Shehadeh, and it was a direct hit. However, his house was in one of the most 
densely populated residential areas on earth.  
In total, fifteen people died in the blast. Up to 150 people received injuries, 
some of them serious and permanent. Eight houses in the vicinity of the 
bombing were completely destroyed and a further nine partially destroyed. A 
further twenty one houses received moderate damage. 
The IDF Spokesperson’s Announcement of 23 July 2002 stated that:  
 
“The IDF attack last night was directed at Salah Shehade and 
him alone. The strike was accurate, carried out using 
designated technology. The objective is to thwart future and 
upcoming terror activities by attacking the source itself, 
namely Shehade. There was no intention of harming members 
of his family or other civilians.”43  
 
The “Yesh Gvul” movement in Israel filed a petition in the Israeli High 
Court on 30 September 2003, asking the court to require the Attorney General 
and the Military Advocate General to mount a criminal investigation with a 
view to putting on trial all those in the command chain of the bombing.44
42 http://www.pchrgaza.org/Intifada/Killings_stat.htm
43http://web.archive.org/web/20030807154927/www.idf.il/english/announcements/200
2/july/23.stm
44 The Yesh Gvul petition is against former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, former 
Defence Minister Binyamin Ben Eliezer, former Chief of Staff Moshe Ya’alon, the 
present Chief of Staff and former Air Force Commander Dan Halutz, former Attorney 
General Elyakim Rubinstein, former Judge Advocate General Menachem Finkelstein 
and others (Yoav Hess et al v Judge Advocate General et al, HCJ case 8794/03). 
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The State of Israel (respondent) maintained that the assassination itself was 
lawful and that the military operation was proportionate to the legitimate aim of 
killing Shehadeh. It stated that the potential for the death of civilians and the 
destruction of property was considered before going on to take the risk, and 
ordering the bombing mission: 
 
“It is important to emphasize that one of the central 
considerations, which were accounted for throughout all 
planning stages of the operation against Shehadeh and its 
approval was the proportionality consideration – the 
obligation to make sure that hitting Shehadeh would not lead to 
hitting the civilian population in his vicinity, disproportionate 
to the military aims the operation set out to achieve. The 
discussions largely dealt with the subject of hitting civilians, 
which may be a result of attacking Shehadeh. 
 
“After the discussion for instance, it had been decided to carry 
out the attack in the late hours of the evening (close to 
midnight), when pedestrians would not be expected to move 
around the street close to the house of Shehadeh. 
 
“Also upon such consideration it had been decided to use one 
bomb of 1000 Kg (which was the quantity of explosives 
required in order to achieve in reasonable probability the aim 
of the operation) and not two bombs of 500 Kg each, because 
the use of two bombs would increase considerably the risk of 
missing the target and as a result endangering a building close 
to that of the intended target with a direct hit.  
 
“At the end, after receiving precise intelligence information 
about the hiding place of Shehadeh, the execution of the 
operation had been decided according to the abovementioned 
outline. This decision was taken at the highest level, having 
described the importance of stopping the activity of Shehadeh, 
despite the information and estimates of the damages to other 
people, which may be caused as a result of the attack.” 45
 
After the respondent replied, on 3 March 2004, the court suspended the 
case, pending a decision on another petition (filed by the Public Committee 
45 HCJ 8794/03 Yoav Hess v Judge Advocate General; Response on Behalf of the State 
Attorney’s Office (translation from Hebrew, all emphases in the original). 
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Against Torture in Israel in January 2002) challenging the lawfulness of the 
assassination policy of the State of Israel.46
On 16 February 2005, a hearing of the “assassination policy” petition was 
held, and that petition was itself adjourned indefinitely as a result of  Prime 
Minister Sharon’s commitment at the Sharm-el Sheikh summit of 8 February 
2005, to suspend the policy of assassinations (“pre-emptive liquidations”).47  
The Yesh Gvul movement wrote to the High Court requesting the petition 
for a criminal investigation into the bombing to be re-opened. Yesh Gvul 
requested a hearing and the State was given to 15 June 2005 to respond. A 
hearing took place on 5 September 2005, when the case was adjourned 
indefinitely (as in the “assassinations policy” case).  
During the course of September 2005, advocates for the petitioners asked 
for a hearing on the assassination policy case, in response to the public 
resumption of that policy by the IDF. During the course of November 2005, the 
State Attorney’s Office agreed that both petitions should be restored for a 
hearing at the High Court. 
On 11 December 2005, a hearing of both petitions was held, and the High 
Court ruled that the Shehadeh petition is dependent on the outcome 
assassination petition. The court gave the State Attorney’s Office 20 days to 
submit further legal arguments, but as of 9 January 2006, he had not done so.  
Meanwhile, the international view of the al-Daraj bombing was that it was 
unlawful and disproportionate. This view is certainly held by the British 
Government. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) issued a 
press release of 23 July 2002, entitled “Civilians must not be attacked” 48 
Several members of the UN Security Council condemned the bombing in those 
terms, including Jack Straw, the British Foreign Secretary, who was in the 
chair, at its meeting on 24 July 2002.49 Before travelling to the UN, Jack Straw 
had told the House of Commons that he would ensure that Sir Patrick 
Cormack’s views “which I think the whole house shares, about the unjustified 
and disproportionate nature of the attack and its consequences are conveyed to 
the ambassador and, through him, to the Israeli Government.”50  
Similarly, after the assassination of the spiritual leader of Hamas, Sheikh 
Yassin, by the Government of Israel, Jack Straw confirmed that the British 
46 HCJ 769/02. 
47 See the PCATI press release: 
http://www.stoptorture.org.il/eng/press.asp?menu=6&submenu=1&item=237
48 http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/5CBJGJ  
49http://domino.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/604c82baa09d068e85256c1a0064bda3?Open
Document
50 Hansard, HC Deb 23 Jul 2002 c840. 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo020723/debtext/2072
3-03.htm  
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Government considered the policy of “so-called assassinations – 
straightforward killings”as  
 
“unlawful, unjustified and self-defeating, and they damage the 
case that Israel makes in the world. The fact that the killings 
led to the deaths of not only those whom Israel holds 
responsible for terrorism, but entirely innocent bystanders, 
including children, simply emphasises the unlawful nature of 
that approach, and its counter-productive effect.”51  
 
Despite the international view taken towards the criminal nature of the acts 
described above, it is clear that a climate of impunity has taken hold in Israel 
and its occupying army, that is unchecked by its own criminal or civil justice 
system. One of the few ways to combat impunity is the practical application of 
universal jurisdiction.  
 
EXERCISING UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION OVER ISRAELI 
SUSPECTS 
 
Certainly where war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity are 
concerned, instead of individual countries doing their duty, in the few cases 
where international consensus has been possible, a “pooling of resources” has 
been achieved through the creation of ad hoc international criminal tribunals 
set up under resolutions of the UN Security Council.  There is no chance of 
such an ad hoc tribunal being established in the foreseeable future in the case of 
Israel, as the US would veto such a proposal at the UN Security Council. 
Furthermore, the International Criminal Court cannot deal with alleged Israeli 
war crimes as Israel has refused to sign up to it. 
Criminal trials in the domestic courts of third-party states (those remote 
from the conflicts in question) since 1949 might have deterred many war 
crimes. However, many alleged crimes in, for example, the occupied territories, 
Kuwait and East Timor have gone unchallenged across the world. Israelis, 
Iraqis and Indonesians should have been arrested and tried in other countries, to 
ensure legal accountability but also to deter criminality.  
Individual states have lacked the political will to prosecute foreign war 
criminals. Countries have resisted getting “involved”, even though they have a 
legal duty to “seek out and prosecute” alleged war criminals and either 
prosecute or extradite those accused of committing offences contrary to 
51 Hansard, HC Deb 30 March 2004 c1043. 
 http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/cm200304/cmhansrd/vo040330/debtext/40330-01.htm  
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UNCAT.  Arguably, a continuing failure to comply with (or even accept) the 
duty to prosecute or extradite those suspected of committing serious 
international crimes, not only will this frustrate all attempts to bring such 
alleged offenders to justice but it will bolster the sense of impunity of such 
persons.52
The British police have discretion as to whether or not to investigate 
particular criminal allegations. That discretion has to be exercised lawfully. 
The law of England and Wales does not entitle the police a “get out clause” not 
to investigate any allegations of such offences, as that would amount to an 
absolute discretion to ignore the duty to uphold the law. So, which cases should 
it investigate? What is the future for universal jurisdiction in England and 
Wales? 
Quite simply, it the authors’ view that, for all the reasons given above, the 
police need to allocate resources to investigate credible allegations of war 
crimes and torture. In the past the police were given resources specifically to 
pursue investigations under the War Crimes Act 1991 (the 1991 Act). More 
than £11 million was reportedly spent by the Home Office (the majority of 
which was allocated to the police) on the investigation of alleged war criminals 
resident in Britain, resulting in only two prosecutions and only one 
conviction.53 Such cases of war crimes were specifically funded by central 
Government over an extended period. The reported cost of investigations to the 
end of 1996 was approximately £6 million for the Metropolitan Police and 
approximately £2 million for the CPS and the expected cost of investigations 
for 1996-97 was about £630,000. Home Office special funding for the war 
crimes unit stopped in 1995, but it was stated during a Parliamentary debate in 
March 1997 that the Metropolitan police would receive a total of £1.7 billion in 
1997-98 for all their policing needs, including war crimes investigations.54
The investigative resources (police officer time and expenses) required to 
prepare evidence files for advice from the CPS in some of these cases is 
relatively modest. For example, in each of the Gaza cases provided to the 
police the suspect has been identified, witnesses identified etc. No great 
difficulties are posed in obtaining further evidence locally in relation to the 
cases now with the police. Anyhow, it would be perverse if a State, such as 
Israel, were to be “rewarded” (i.e. by police inaction) for making it more 
difficult for the British police to investigate alleged crimes committed under 
military occupation. These will clearly be much cheaper cases to investigate 
52 See Cherif Bassiouni and Wise, above n 28, p 24. 
53 A case against Szymon Serafinowicz, a collaborationist police chief allegedly 
personally responsible for hundreds of killings, collapsed in 1997 after the jury decided 
he was not fit to plead. Twenty elderly witnesses were brought to Britain and more than 
£2m spent before the trial collapsed. 
54 Hansard HC Deb, 5 Mar 1997 c1004, as regards the expenditure under the 1991 Act.  
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than those investigated under the 1991 Act referred to above. Indeed, in some 
cases the investigative burden is minimal and the case will revolve primarily 
around legal issues (i.e. as to “military necessity”).  
In this context the comments of DAC Peter Clarke on 19 July 2005, just 
after the conviction of Mr Zardad (reported to have been the first) under s134 
Criminal Justice Act, are relevant: 
 
“We had to find witnesses in remote parts of Afghanistan and 
give them the confidence to come forward to give evidence in 
a British court. The fact that they did so is testament to their 
courage and to the skill of the police officers who supported 
them. It was a huge challenge, in the prevailing circumstances 
in Afghanistan, to investigate and find evidence to the standard 
demanded by the British courts. Today’s verdict shows what 
can be achieved, and that the UK is not a safe haven for people 
like Zardad.” 55  
 
These comments suggest that there will not be impunity in England and 
Wales for torturers or war criminals, even after the investigative burden placed 
on the police since the bombings in London of 7 July 2005.  
Accordingly, police forces in third party states, including in this country, 
will continue to be given evidence to consider on a case by case basis. The task 
facing victims and their legal advisers is to persuade police forces across the 
world to conduct expeditious and robust preliminary investigations so that 
decisions can be made in each case whether to arrest the suspect on arrival in 
their jurisdiction. Police forces will in that way put themselves in a position 
where arriving suspects can actually be arrested and charged, where the 
evidence permits. 
If the police engage with these issues in a serious way, the very prospect of 
alleged war criminals being brought to justice in Britain or any other country is 
likely to provide a deterrent to future perpetrators of war crimes. Criminal trials 
would certainly provide genuine deterrence and begin to provide justice for 
victims, where justice has eluded them at home. The end of impunity would 
then be in sight. 
55http://cms.met.police.uk/news/convictions/terrorism/afghan_warlord_jailed_followin
g_anti_terrorist_investigation
 
